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Memory, according to Henri Bergson, is gleaned from the
present and realises the present perception from its
sensory-motor elements through movements towards that
which it perceives.
The purpose of this article is to propose and debate the
deliberate use of such ‘present memory’ in the sonic artwork.
The suggestion is that sonic memory material – sounds that
are plundered from old recordings – can be collaged into
complex sonic works to produce, not a nostalgic experience
in the sense of a recognition of the past, but a current
production of sonic material in a continually present
perception. Such a production strategy employs the affective
quality of memory to ‘trigger’ a sensorial engagement in the
sense of a ‘pathetic’ engagement understood as an emotional
and sentimental involvement with the work. The
understanding is that such an emotional engagement involves
the listener centrally in the production of the artwork and
challenges modernist (visual) art discourses, which evaluate
the work from a distance.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this article I would like to propose a strategy of
working with what I will call sonic memory material,
sounds that are plundered from old films, radio broad-
casts, records, etc., in order to produce not a nostalgic
experience in the sense of a recognition of the past, but
a current production of sonic material. The main tenet
of this suggestion is that memory is not something we
summon from the past, from which we are temporally
and geographically remote, but that it is triggered by a
current event and becomes materialised in the now.
Memory produces our present perception and at the
same time, it ‘. . . can only become actual by means of
the perception which attracts it’ (Bergson 1991: 127).
It is from the present that the appeal to which memory
responds comes, and it is from the sensory-motor
elements of present action that a memory borrows the
warmth which gives it life. (ibid.: 153)
Bergson’s notion of memory sets up present percep-
tion as an activity, as movements towards that which
we perceive; movements, which prolong and extend
the idea of the past in the present. Essentially virtual,
pure memory becomes actual in our present percep-
tion understood as an active motion towards the
world. I will employ this model of memory production
to discuss the use of sonic memory material as a
strategy for artistic production and its perception.
In this sense, this article does not set out to observe
or document the use of sonic memory material in exist-
ing work. This investigation is not that of a critic or
art historian, surveying the field of plunderphonic pro-
ductions. I do not wish to produce a generic definition
of work that uses plundered sounds. It does not appear
useful to me to arrest the multiplicity of such produc-
tions in typified descriptions. In fact, such descriptions
would only counter my attempt at articulating the
contingent subjectivity of their production. Rather,
the purpose of this text is to articulate a strategy of
production and perception, a work manual if you like,
for ‘home-assembly’. The focus of this text, then, is not
on sonic artwork per se, but on the issues relevant to its
production and perception.
The purpose of using sonic memory material as
a strategy of production is to ‘trigger’ a sensorial
engagement with the audio-visual or sonic artwork, in
the sense of a ‘pathetic’ engagement understood as an
emotional and sentimental involvement with the work.
This pathetic involvement stands in contrast to the
aesthetic rigour of artistic production.1 Aesthetic
theory articulates the totality of the artwork from a
distance (i.e. from a visual place). By contrast,
memory is affective, it moves us towards the action
of perception in which it becomes realised. The
suggestion is that such a sensorial engagement focuses
and organises our perception and gets us involved in
the production of the work.
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1In his third volume on Modern Painters, John Ruskin writes against
the ‘pathetic fallacy’ arguing that an emotional viewing falsifies the
artwork. ‘All violent feelings have the same effect. They produce in
us a falseness in all our impressions of external things’ (Ruskin
1903: 170). Instead he promotes the idea of pure facts and rational-
ity for the better production and judgement of art. In this context I
borrow Ruskin’s interpretation of the term pathetic as a strong
emotional engagement, but use it explicitly to stress the imaginative
and emotional quality of memory material, suggesting that it is
precisely the pathetic quality of memory that triggers the engage-
ment necessary to produce the work in a generative perception. This
generative perception stands in contrast to the formal rigour of
(modernist) aesthetics. Aesthetic theory pretends the possibility of
an objective reading and evaluates the work according to clearly
typified and categorised manifestations, or in the post-modern
through contextual or relational frameworks, both of which grant a
distanced view rather than an (emotional) immersive engagement
with the material.
14 Salomé Voegelin
Emotions, according to Noël Carroll, ‘motivate
behaviour’ (Carrol 1997: 199). The behaviour I under-
stand memory material to motivate is a generative
engagement with the artwork. In this sense, what I
attempt to provoke is a sensorial and emotional
engagement with the work via the use of sonic memory
material.
This aim is staged against the backdrop of a
modernist aesthetic. And we are, even within post-
modernism, working according to modernist prin-
ciples and attitudes, producing modernist work
which refrains from and even despises any emotional
interaction with the material and prefers a formalist,
analytical reading instead. Sentimentality and nostal-
gia are frowned upon and marginalised into the realm
of indigenous or feminist practices. Within the art
field, sentimentality is formalised via the notion of
Kitsch, managed within the aesthetic rationality of
this identification, and as such drained of any real
emotional production.
My suggestion is that sonic memory material chal-
lenges such a modernist pragmatism by triggering an
emotional engagement instead. With this suggestion I
do not propose that anything that produces emotions
is a work of art. I do not intend to open the field of art
to anything goes as long as it makes me feel. This I
believe would only invite prompt marginalisation and
would not make for good art. Rather, the professional
field and its rigorous framework of production and
evaluation have to be in place. And it is then, even
if paradoxically, within this formal field of artistic
production, that memory material provokes the sen-
sorial engagement that generates the work in a way
that is useful to the field. It is the rigour of the art field
that allows me to ‘feel’ something without floundering
into an ‘unsayable’ that destroys artistic production.2
What is important in relation to this argument is the
particular ability of sound in the production of such
an emotional engagement. I argue that it is sound’s
quasi-virtual, immaterial blindness and ‘immersivity’
that renders it more effective than the visual in pro-
moting an emotional engagement with the work.
Bergson’s memory in its pure state is virtual, only
actualised in perception, and even then it retains a
touch of virtuality. The same I argue is true for sound.
And, this virtual residue of the sonic, I believe, is
what allows for an emotional and even sentimental
engagement with the work.
2. SONIC MEMORY MATERIAL
Memory, according to Bergson, is the intersection of
mind and matter. It challenges the idealists as well as
the realists and complicates the idea of present
perception by placing its trigger in the past. In this
sense, memory is forever becoming and has never
been. It is not dialectically opposed to the idea of
present but realises the present as an affection towards
the world. In this way it is wholly dependent on the
individual perceiving. Memory extends from me into
perception, producing that which I perceive.
In this understanding there is no space for aesthetic
distanciation.3 The individual is sensorially involved
in this generating of the present. Consequently it is
impossible not to be emotionally and presently
involved in anything that is here now. Memory as a
sensory-motor activity prepares and guides my actions
towards the world that it generates. That is not to say
that there are things in this room that do not remain
unaffected by my memory, I am sure there are, but
they are not, at this moment, present to me.
This understanding of memory makes it central
to my idea of artistic production in general and the
production of sound art in particular. If, as I suggest,
memory triggers the production of the now in such
an audience-centred way, then the introduction of
memory material into a sonic artwork provokes a
listener-based production of the work and challenges
the critical conventions of modernism and its ‘visual’
discourses, which favour a distanciated perspective.
Visual memory presents, whereas sonic memory
suggests. Vision explores surfaces and creates over-
views. Its aesthetic discourses aspire to objectivity and
a rational understanding of its spatial relations.
Sound’s ephemerality plunges you instead into the
blind depths of materiality and engages you in an
2I borrow this term ‘unsayable’ from Julia Kristeva’s essay ‘The
imaginary sense of forms’. In this essay, Kristeva describes and
discusses a particular viewing of sculptures by Alain Kirili which
she views ‘in the midst of the Gulf War’ at Commandement XI, in
Paris. I am inspired by her idea that sculpture, the artwork, ‘lends its
geometry to our projections, body and soul’. Rather than insisting
on making her perception coincide with an art-historically verified
reading, she understands the material ‘lends itself to the most
unsayable aspects of our corporeal experience’ (Kristeva 1991:
29–30). I take measure on her method of viewing an artwork, and
understand sonic memory material to perform just such a contin-
gent projection, ‘body and soul’. However, I am aware that this
sensorial engagement is framed by and thus made ‘sayable’, in the
sense of determined, within the rigour of the gallery context. It is
corporeal but not floundering.
3The Brechtian term distanciation (Verfremdungseffect) describes
the aesthetic process of producing a critical distance through the
focus on the structures and materiality of the work. The processes
of production are foregrounded in order to prevent empathy with
the narrative or the characters. Bertolt Brecht used distanciation as
a strategy for politicising the audience. However, I believe that a
more complex and less collective political subjectivity is produced
via a generative and sensorial immersivity. In this sense, my term
immersivity critiques the Brechtian desire for critical distance and
places criticality not in the place of the spectacle (the visual) but
its generative perception, which is more akin to a sonic sensibility.
Implicit in this critique of distanciation is the idea that criticism is
not produced from an (aesthetic) distance, reading the artwork as a
text, but through a physical involvement with the work.
Sonic memory material as ‘pathetic trigger’ 15
immersive production of its relationships. The artist
working with sound can provoke and stimulate this
engaged production by consciously playing with what
I term sonic memory material: sounds plundered from
radio broadcasts, records, feature films, the television,
etc. This material sampled and collaged together,
emphasises the tension between the now and the past
in current perception and draws the listener into its
production. The idea here is of course not to simply
add different source material and expect them to do
something exciting. Rather, what I am suggesting is
the production, or the stimulation of the production,
of narratives, through a complex collaging of different
sonic elements. These sounds are brought together not
for their ‘visual’ characteristic, what they signify, but
for their material particularity and what they come to
mean in an embodied understanding.
The introduction of 1950s film sound, for example,
opens a particular space in the artwork by its record-
ing quality alone.4 The distinctiveness of its recording
quality imports a particular ‘old’ or nostalgic space
that is opened when listening to the work. This space is
then ‘filled’ by the individual listener. His/her memory
rushes in and produces a whole host of potential reali-
ties. Add to this recording quality the voices and
sounds of that era and the present artwork is made
more complex by a whole range of registers that will all
have to be produced by the listener. The sentimental
quality of the glass cut voices, the quaint music and
muffled sound effects, build a filmic scene that is not
really here now, but is produced in the juxtaposition of
the memory material and its present perception.
The idea of introducing such sounds is not then one
of re-presenting the 1950s.5 Its aim in the context of the
artwork is not that of documenting and rendering real.
Rather, this material is brought together so as to
produce the idea of a possible event, or indeed an
impossible event, rather than the re-presentation of an
actual occurrence. It presents a melting together of
then and now, a possible past produced in the present,
a false memory, being laid out for us to indulge in and
get carried away by. However, none of these memories
produced in this space are really false. When every
memory is actualised in the present perception, there
is no such thing as a false memory but only real
fictional spaces produced between imagination and
remembered reality.
Memory organises bodies and materials towards
a reality that is ideal in the contingent moment of its
perception. In other words, it dispels the opposition
between ideality and reality, and instead purports
reality as continually present, individual actions
towards the world. The plundered material from a
1950s film sound track does not evoke in me the ‘real’
1950s. What I hear are sounds that I produce at this
moment through an amalgamation of various ‘images’
and ideas in my present reality of that time. The 1950s
are produced now, not remembered.
The enjoyment and generative quality of this
fictional space is, even if paradoxically, assured by the
generic particularity of the material used: film music,
film voices, sound effects, etc., produce a particular
sonic ‘space’ with which the audience engages
emotionally but not universally. The generic quality of
the sonic material, its conventional structure and tone,
is what allows us to produce it individually. These are
not particular or personal memories, but general
memory material, embedded in the conventions of
their time and place. The specificity of its style and
‘quality’ triggers numerous contingent imaginations.
What we hear is not a particular shared narrative,
but affectively produced individual and contingent
narrations.
In relation to this, the use of a well-known record-
ing, say of Martin Luther King’s 1963 speech at the
Lincoln Memorial in Washington D.C., ‘I Have a
Dream . . .’, inhibits the production of a present imag-
ining. This recording is not sonic memory material
in the sense that I have identified it above. Its iconic
status overrides a generative engagement. It is a sonic
icon, recognisable rather than imaginable. It has
become a sonic signifier, a quasi-visual and substantial
‘thing’, that can be heard from a distance rather than
produced in an engaged listening. In this sense, I
would refrain from using such highly charged and
recognisable material, as it will not trigger the wished
for pathetic involvement but only produce a detached
recognition, producing a quasi-visual distanciation.
In the same way, I would avoid overt processing
of the sonic memory material. Analogue or digital
processing and sound manipulation might mask the
generic quality of the material and would instead
foreground the processing mechanism, leading to a
technological distanciation.
Instead, a more generic and unspecified material
that remains materiality rather than becoming a signi-
fier, is what is needed. Sonic material that alludes to a
past at large rather than a particular event and thus is
not closed down in a present knowing but rather
produced in a present imagining. And this present
imagining is individual rather than universal.
In a sense then I am setting up a neo-romantic
position. An ostensibly romantic position, but one
4The 1950s soundtrack is of course only one example of sonic
memory material. Any other recording would be equally valid and
would bring with it a whole host of sonic qualities in which to
become immersed.
5These 1950s sounds do not have to be recognised as 1950s sounds.
Recognition might add another dimension, a personal recollection,
a smile on the listener’s lips. However, the issue is not the event
re-created but a possible event being produced. In this sense, recog-
nition of the era of recording is not a pre-requisite for memory
material to produce a pathetic engagement.
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where emotionality and sentimentality are producing
the work without, however, surrendering the formal
rigour of the artwork, its material structure and
position in art discourse, to an esoteric sense of
personal feelings. And neither do they propose the
idea of a universal representation of collective senti-
mentality via the idea of the void. Present memory
does not produce a gap between then and now and
hence does not produce a longing for something of
another time or another place. Rather it immerses
me in the present narrative of its production and
any longing perceived becomes a longing for the now.
Any void felt by the listener is an individual and senso-
rial rather than an aesthetic void, and thus cannot
be filled through a representational replacement.
Instead it invites a subjective and mobile production
of the sensorial material. My neo-romanticism then
is immersive and contingent rather than pictorial.
Consequently it never allows the listener to take a
distanced position from which he/she could replenish
an experiential void.
This present quality makes memory material rel-
evant now and does not justify a marginalisation of its
sentimentality. Nostalgia is not the exclusive pursuit
of women and natives, unable to focus on facts and
losing themselves in sentimental fictions. And neither
can it be distilled in a singular and universal romantic
vision. Memory motivates the listening and triggers a
pathetic production essential for the perception of the
work. In this sense it cannot be passed off as trivial to
artistic production. Without this engagement we do
not experience but only read work. We can read Kitsch
as an aestheticised and ironic version of sentimental-
ity, mocking sentimentality and closing the space of its
production. Kitsch is the modernist plug to sentimen-
tality and emotions, separating the artwork from
feelings and re-investing it in the categories of modern-
ist discourses. In this sense Kitsch is not a post-modern
practice as much as a motioning of post-modernism
back into the fold of modernist principles, from which
it never really strayed in the first place.
3. MODERNISM AND SENTIMENTALITY
The modernist aesthetic focuses on the production of
form, the substantial, the essential, the categorisable
artwork. In search of objectivism, the modernist art
critic sets down clear rules as to what is good art in
respect to clearly typified and categorised manifesta-
tions. From this principle identification, modernism
mobilises the idea of unity and totality, deliberating
the qualities and characteristics of the total artwork.
According to Jean-François Lyotard, modernist art
theory seeks ‘to preserve various consciousnesses
from doubt’ (Lyotard 1994: 74). Its aim is to establish
the artwork as certain and knowable in relation to a
transcendental a priori. Its vocabulary consequently
accommodates the description and judgement of
spatial and substantial work: painting and sculpture,
at some distance from the viewer. Modernism in this
sense is a thoroughly visual discourse, it scans the
surface and measures spaces, in search for a total
ideality.6
In relation to music, it is the score that substantiates
and qualifies the work in an a priori. The score
visualises and thus spatialises and arrests the temporal
performance in an ideal temporality. The score is
proof of its existence and determines its value. Accord-
ing to Theodor W. Adorno, it is the quasi objective
relationship between tones in harmonic intervals in
relation to the compositional totality of the work that
renders the musical work ideal. The temporal quality
of music, which could be seen as its critical edge vis-à-
vis spatial art practices, is for Adorno a problem,
unless it is compositionally controlled; the temporal
sounds fixed in what he terms a Notenbild (an image of
notes).7
Such modernist criteria for discussing and judging a
piece of work, visual or sonic, sees the processes of
viewing and listening as having no impact on the
appearance of the artwork nor on the subject perceiv-
ing it. The viewing/listening subject is assumed as a
fixed identity, he/she too is totalised and unified as a
transcendental subject.
4. THE VIRTUAL RESIDUE OF THE SONIC
Sound work that is ‘blind’ in the sense of working on
the virtual residue of memory, cannot be totalised in
this fashion. It necessarily involves the listener in its
production and does not offer a distanciated position
from which to totalise the work in an ideality that is
remote from the sensorial material.
Bergson’s understanding that present perception is
already memory, and his observation that the past
is virtual, actualised in a present perception whilst
retaining an element of virtuality, seems to describe
sound more than it does the visual. The visual insists
6Ideality is used here in the sense of the Hegelian notion of Idealität
of an ‘ideal objectivity’, which for him decides the beauty of art as
an absolute beauty that has overcome the ‘Widerspruch’ (antagonis-
tic contradiction) between discord and harmony in sublimation
(Aufhebung), and has attained an ideal objective state, which is
understood as ideal spirituality (Hegel 1979: 70).
7A danger that I observe in much contemporary discourse on Sonic
Art is that the score is simply replaced by a technological manual.
The Notenbild is replaced by illustrations of software processes and
hardware interfaces, the ideology of an a priori objectivism remains
in place, however. The work is identified within these processes
only, and the listening subject too is fixed in relation to this ideal
totality. Such a focus on the production processes, as composition,
retains Sonic Arts’ discourse within a modernist aesthetic. It avoids
a consideration of the experiential status of the work, which would
problematise any compositional control, intention, and the unified
appreciation of the work.
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on a pure presentness, it is either perceived to be here
or it is not. By contrast, sound phases in and out,
sometimes I can hear it clearly, sometimes only a soft
murmur passes my ear. The connection between a
real, actually present, sound and a virtual sound is a
matter of degree rather than of substance. It is always
my embodied listening that realises sound, however
virtual its material reality remains. Hence the division
between an imagined sound and a real sound is rather
fragile. At the centre of this fragile connection is my
listening as a movement towards the sound work,
which produces this work in my imagination.
In this sense, sound seems to be following post-
modern principles, which, according to Lyotard, do
not invite the understanding of the artwork as supply-
ing or representing one total and ideal reality of the
work, but rather assume artistic experience as ‘real’
and ‘ideal’ in the sense that the audience connects it
to a personal and individual experience. In Lyotard’s
terms, postmodernism puts forward that which in
modernism remains unrepresentable. I understand his
use of the term ‘unrepresentable’ as referring to the
moment when the modernist objective vocabulary
clashes with the imaginative production of the indi-
vidual listener and fails to account for his/her contin-
gent experience. It is the moment when the objective
observations and criticality put forward by modernist
art theory alienate and limit the individual subject
experiencing the work. Consequently, the subject
seeks to free him/herself from this objective and essen-
tialist interpretation to pursue his/her own pleasures
and emotions in the work.
The affective quality of memory motivates such
an individual engagement and focuses listening as a
motion towards the work. It can be used by the artist
to stimulate and manipulate the listener through
material narratives. In turn these narratives become
‘told’ and ‘re-told’ by the listener in his/her perception.
These are then not modernist (grand) narratives,
histories of aesthetic rationality, universal and fixed,
but local and temporal (small) narratives: fluid stories,
continually narrated. A heterogeneity of memories
triggered by the same memory material, stirring up a
plethora of emotional extensions of the work. In this
sense, the postmodern is a radicalisation of the mod-
ernist understanding of the artwork through a focus
on perception. It is no longer one objective referent,
or universal memory, that determines a current per-
ception of the artwork. Rather, it is the multitude of
memories that the listeners bring to the work which
trigger and are actualised by this contingent process of
perception and which continually develop the inter-
pretation and judgement of the work. However, in
the overall context of modernism, the postmodern
excursion into an emotional involvement is ultimately
redeemed through discourse.
Postmodern discourse is not opposed to modernism
and its way of theorising art but is rather a logical
interpretation and development of its idealism of
totality and unity via the consideration of perception:
challenging modernism via a temporal dimension.
The temporal allows for a more dynamic, fragmented
and nonlinear engagement with the work. But, as an
essentially modernist philosophy, postmodern aes-
thetic still refrains from sentimentality. Postmodern
discourses limit emotions within a representation of
sentimentality, Kitsch, the confessional, performance,
etc. These are fragmented practices that seemingly
invite the complicity of the audience, but soon discard
their emotional engagement through critical theory.
The apparent openness, then, to an emotional engage-
ment is reduced again to rational knowledge and
an idealised perception. My memories that trigger my
engagement with the work are limited by a particular
reading, contextualised through theoretical discourse,
visually, rather than extending from the sensorial
materiality.
5. CONCLUSION
The problem, then, with the visual principles of
modernism and postmodernism in relation to sonic
practices and the activation of the artwork via
memory, lies not with their actual practices but their
theoretical discourses, which take the sensorial out of
the material and disregard emotions and sentim-
entality. If, as Carroll suggests, emotions motivate
behaviour and thus produce an active attitude towards
the artwork, memory as the trigger of such a pathetic
engagement should not be drained through precon-
ceived theoretical values and ideas. My suggestion
is that through the use of sonic memory material we
can re-invest in the emotional, and thus re-invest in
individual perception, without becoming esoteric and
doubtful, and without proclaiming a grand universal
narrative either. The postmodern context, I believe,
offers a rigid and yet flexible enough framework
in which to be engaged with the sensorial material,
without losing sight of professional practice. The
conventions and borders of art practice, sonic or
visual, are defined enough to withstand an emotional
onslaught. The ‘pathetic’, I am convinced, will find
a new articulation in current aesthetic discourses. And
I believe that the understanding of the status and
consequence of memory in the processes of present
perception is a crucial factor in this re-evaluation.
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